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As compared  with  traditional  paper-based  versions  and  the standard  username-
-password login to e-Government services, the new electronic identity and travel
documents have made on-site electronic and on-line authentication of citizen more
comfortable and secure.
The biometric  passport  was  introduced  in Hungary  in 2006.  A decade  later
the electronic  identity  card  (eID)  was  implemented.  The reason  for
the improvement  of such documents  is  twofold:  enhancing security features  and
performing  new  functions.  The development  is  certainly  welcome,  but  it  also
generates new types of risks, with which governments and citizens must take into
account.
In this  paper,  I  will  first  analyze  the most  widespread  technologies  of data
storage  cards from the passive  elements  to the chipcards,  including the biometric
passport.  The objective  is  to provide  an overview  of the technical  development
as a background to my paper. I will then proceed to an analysis of the relevant EU
and national  legal  background,  data elements,  data  protection and the functions
(ePASS,  eID,  eSIGN) of the new Hungarian and German identity  card,  as well
as the security risks and protection properties of the eID-type documents. The paper
concludes  with  a summary  of the lessons  learned  from  and  the risks  involved
in the current solutions in Hungary and Germany.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The primary technology used to manage physical access and identification
of persons is the card, which is widely used as a means of possession-based
authentication for several years now.
Such cards are  designed to store  data  for  identity  or access  purposes.
These tools are categorized per the storage method and device type. Both
the storage  capacity,  security,  and  usability  depend  on the technology
of these devices.
The most  straightforward  data  storage  option  is  provided  by passive
solutions, such as punched cards, barcodes, and magnetic stripes, also used
in bank  cards.  A later  version  includes  memory  chips  for  data  storage,
without the possibility of data processing, e.g. encryption. These solutions
have been used for a long time for official documents, primarily to ensure
efficient machine data processing.
2. DATA STORAGE ON CARDS
A well-known data card type is the magnetic card. Here the data carrier is
a magnetic  metal  stripe,  sealed  on a plastic  sheet.  This  medium  requires
contact between the card and the reader. The magnetic reader heads, known
from  the tape  recorder,  have  to be  in physical  contact  with  the card.
The technology  is  specified  by several  standards,  such  as the ISO  7811,
ISO 7812, ISO 7813 and the ISO 4909. The amount of data stored is limited
to about a hundred bytes. For example, in the case of a bank card, the same
data is stored as shown on the surface, completed with a couple of control
data.1 Its  use  is  still  ongoing,  due to its  simplicity.  It  is  also suitable  for
identification  without  supervision.  Using  a PIN  code,  you  can  increase
security  significantly.  Its  counterfeiting  can  be  done  by reading
the magnetic  stripe  and magnetizing  a blank card,  so it  does not  require
sophisticated  knowledge.  Consequently,  visual  identification  is  also
1 See Visdómine,  L.  P.  (2002) Track  format  of magnetic  stripe  cards.  [online]  Available  from:
http://www.gae.ucm.es/~padilla/extrawork/tracks.html [Accessed 10 September 2017].
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essential  here.  For  this  reason,  bank  cards  typically  feature  hologram
document security elements.
One or two-dimensional barcode cards are also used for identification.
The amount  of data  stored  is  smaller  than on magnetic  cards.  In the case
of one-dimensional (linear) barcode, capacity is a few bytes. The encoding is
defined  in international  standards,  widely  used  are  EAN  8  or EAN  13,
introduced  in 1978.  As a further  development  of the linear  barcode,
the square  data  matrix  code  appeared  in the early  1990's.  The black-and-
-white data matrix has a data storing capacity of up to 2335 alphanumeric
characters.2 Similar is the today's fashionable QR code, shown in Figure 1.
It can also be read easily by mobile devices, thanks to its design.
Figure 1: QR code3
The drawback  of these  methods  is  that  the barcode  is  readable  for
unauthorized  persons,  it  can  be  copied,  and  it  can  be  counterfeited.
To prevent reading data out,  the barcode may have a top coat which can
only  read  by infrared  light.  By this  method,  counterfeiting  can  be
significantly complicated.
Figure 2: An earlier version of the USA residency permit4
2 See Eiler, E. (2008) Kódnyomtatás és nyomtatott vonalkód rendszerek (Code printing and
printed barcode systems), Magyar Grafika (Hungarian Graphic), 2008(5), p. 44.
3 Kaywa AG.  Kaywa  QR Code generator [online]  Available  from: https://qrcode.kaywa.com
[Accessed 20 August 2017].
4 Department  of Homeland  Security.  U.  S.  Citizenship  and  Immigration  Services:  Acceptable
Documents.  [online]  Available  from:  https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/acceptable-
documents/list-documents/form-i-9-acceptable-documents  [Accessed 15 September 2017].
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Because of its high cost, the laser card is a less popular method. A stripe
like  a compact  disc  is  sealed on a hard-plastic  data  carrier,  which  a laser
beam can read in a width of 1.6 to 3.5 cm. The amount of data that can be
stored  (from 1.1 MB to 2.8 MB)  is  far  higher  than the previous  methods.
In the top line of Figure 2 is  a one-dimensional  barcode,  an optical  (laser)
data storage under it.  At the bottom, there is  an MRZ (Machine Readable
Zone) code, which simplifies machine data reading.
The standard feature of the cards described so far is that it is not possible
or it is very difficult to change their data content. They do not contain active
elements,  which  would allow their  safer  use.  If it  is  necessary  to change
the stored data, another method should be applied. A more reliable solution
is  the use  of memory  circuits,  where  data  is  stored  in an electronically
programmable  non-volatile  memory  circuit  (EEPROM).  For  convenience
reasons,  the memory chip  is  embedded in a larger  plastic  card.  They are
used,  for  example,  in Hungarian  phone  cards.  Counterfeiting  in the case
of commercial memory circuits is not excessively burdensome. The hacker
should only  attach the reader  to a computer  and emulate  a memory card
with credits available.
The use of cards was revolutionized by the introduction of active cards,
on which it is not only possible to write and read the data, but the card can
do data processing and other mathematical operations. The microcontroller
is  the core  element  of the active  tags.  The microcontroller  is  a quasi-
-complete computer, practically made on an integrated circuit  card (chip).
It contains a processor,  a non-volatile  memory (ROM, FLASH),  a random-
-access  memory  (RAM),  input/output  units  (I/O),  and  other  auxiliary
elements (such as a real-time clock and similar). The microcontroller enables
the implementation of the fourth-generation encryption systems, providing
proactive protection for stored data and access. Depending on the type, its
storing capacity may range from 1 to 256 kilobytes. Using a microcontroller,
you can also  create contact  and contactless  (touchless  or proximity)  data
cards.  Such  contact  data  cards  are  the smart  cards  (chip  cards).  These
were used in Hungary in the old type of higher education student ID cards,
as well as on bank cards (EMV chip). Microcontrollers are also the primary
means  of storing  the private  key  of the electronic  signature  (this  is  done
on the SSCD,  a secure  electronic  signature  device).  There  are  several
international standards relating to chip cards, both from functionality and
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security considerations,5 for example,  the ISO/IEC 7816. To read the data,
the reader  must  have  direct  electronic  contact  with  the microcontroller
outlets. Apparently, this is the fastest and safest way of data transfer.
A contactless realization of the proximity card (RFID card) is the micro
controller's active data card. The embedded microcontroller is substantially
the same  as the one  used  in smart  cards.  The main  difference  is  that  its
connection to the reader is made at radio frequency. Its operating principle
is  that  the data  card  has  a large  coil  antenna,  which  is  connected
to the microcontroller.  Per the basic  design,  the card  does  not  contain
a power  source,  but  it  takes  the operating  power  of the electromagnetic
field,  generated  by the reader.  So,  while  the card  is  getting  closer
to the reader, it automatically turns on, and it emits a modulated signal. For
example,  the card  sends  an identification  number.  The reader  will  check
if this  identification  number  is  included  in its  database  and,  depending
on the result,  it  permits  entry.  The shortcoming  of this  system  is  easily
recognizable since only the electromagnetic field of the given frequency is
required  to obtain  the data.  So the card  reveals  its  identification  number
to any reader, including a malicious person's reader. He/she only writes this
identification number to an empty card to maliciously copy the original one.
To prevent  this  copying,  the reader  can  also  be  combined  with  reader
identification. At the time when the card reaches the electromagnetic space,
it only indicates its presence, and the reader sends its identification code.
The card  will  only  reveal  its  identification  number  if the code  is  listed
on the list of authorized readers stored in the card's memory. Data transfer
can  also  be  protected  by  encryption  of data  transfer,  for  example,  using
cryptography  or a public  key  infrastructure  (PKI)  technology.6 Because
of the radio  frequency  transmission,  the speed  of communication  and
therefore  the amount  of stored  data  is  also  several  orders  of magnitude
smaller  than  the ones  of the contact  smart  cards.  Usually,  a length
of the 26…  37-bit  code  is  used.  The standard  reading  distance  of several
centimeters can even be increased up to ten meters (long range proximity)
with  a built-in  battery.  Proximity  technology  is  described  in the ISO/IEC
14443 standard. In order for these cards to be used in public documents for
authentication functions, cards must be improved and configured securely.
5 See Hassler,  V.  (1995)  IT Security  and Smart  Card  Standards.  Graz,  Austria:  Institutes  for
Information Processing Graz.
6 Apparently, this is the case with e-Passport and eID solutions. The basic design shows only
the security of proximity (RFID) card security.
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3. BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION IN CARD TECHNOLOGY
The next  generation  of active  cards  is  their  combination  with  biometric
security elements. The most characteristic feature of the human integument
is  the face,  which,  due to the underdevelopment of other  senses  of Homo
Sapiens  (e.g. smelling),  is  the primary  means  of identification  of persons
in addition  to its  socio-communication  function.  Its  application  is
instinctive, and the human race applies it from the beginning. The first trace
of using  other  biometric  features  was  the use  of fingerprint  in China
in the 14th Century,  to identify  children,  which  was  recorded
by the explorer, Joao de Barros.7 In Europe, first Alphonse Bertillon, a Paris
police officer introduced a body-size-based identification system in 1890, for
identification of criminals. His method was not successful because of a mass
occurrence of false positives. The fingerprint was first used for forensic aims
by Richard  Edward  Henry,  at Scotland  Yard,  based  on Bertillon's  work.
In the 20th century, Karl Pearson at the University College of London, who
dealt with applied mathematics, made significant discoveries in biometrics.
In the 1960s,  considerable  progress  was  made  in signature –  dynamics
analysis,  which,  however,  remained  in the military  and national  security
applications.  With  the increasing  threat  of terror,  the state  enforcement
of biometric  identification  in the United  States  and  Western  Europe  has
increased dramatically.
Currently  the following  biometric  features  are  widely  used  for
identification:
• fingerprint;
• hand geometry;
• palm print;
• vein pattern;
• grip dynamics recognition;
• skull thermal image;
• 2D facial features;
• 3D facial features;
• iris (iris diaphragm) recognition;
• retina (peripheral vein network) recognition;
7 See  Osborn,  A.  (2005)  Biometrics  history.  Looking  at biometric  technologies  from  the past
to the present.  [online]  Available  from:  http://ezinearticles.com/?Biometrics-History----
Looking-at-Biometric-Technologies-from-Past-to-Present&id=91803 [Accessed 2 September
2017].
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• voice recognition;
• signature dynamics;
• keystroke dynamics;
• DNA;
• recognition of posture.
They  are  applied  to identify  people  with  different  success.
By mathematical description and storage of biometric features, it is possible
to make a more accurate identification, based on individual data.
In the history  of travel  documents,  by the integration  of data  cards
as complementary element and biometrics,  as a higher  degree of personal
bound,  a new  generation  was  created,  which  means  significantly  higher
reliability in the area of document security.
Figure 3: e-Passport8
After  the United  States,  the introduction  of electronic  Passports
(e-Passports),  shown in Figure  3,  has  also  begun in the European Union.
The main reasons for this are increasing the security of travel documents,
as well as remaining in the US Visa Waiver Program, which means the visa-
-free regime of the EU states.  For Hungary, the introduction of e-Passport
aimed  at getting  into  the program  at that  time.  The e-Passport  is
an incorporation  of a contactless  chip  card,  described  above,  into
the passport.  First,  saving  only  the data  page,  and  then  the fingerprint
as well.  E-Passport  was  first  introduced  in Sweden  in October  2005
in Europe  according  to the Council  of the European  Union.9 In Hungary,
since August 2006, the full content of the data page was found in the storage
8 Bundesamt  für  Sicherheit  in der  Informationstechnik.  The electronic  passport.  [online]
Available  from:  https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/ElectrIDDocuments/EPassport/
epassport_node.htm  [Accessed 20 June 2017].
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element, together with the photo and signature as well.  The fingerprint  is
also stored since 2008.
By the Council's  decision,  until  28th June  2009,  all  the EU  states  had
to move  on to apply  e-Passports,  also  containing  fingerprints,  which
triggered resistance  of recognized  data  protection  specialists  in many EU
countries. The new EU-level data protection legislation (GDPR) categorizes
biometric data in special category of personal data.10
Security measures have been implemented to protect the stored data, but
the exact  control  depends  on the member  country.11 Apart  from
conventional  document  security  procedures  (embedded  photo  and
signature,  unique  patterns,  special  paints),  the electronic  storage  unit
destroys  the stored  content  because  of a physical  attack.12 On the other
hand, the chip is  capable of active authentication, which is  done by using
the integrated  PKI  private  key,  and  there  is  also  the digital  certificate
of the passport  publisher  in it.  For  the access  to the data  page,  the Basic
Access Control (BAC) method is  used. Its operation is  as follows:  similar
to the ID card, the MRZ code can be found in the lower part of the passport
data  page.  The MRZ  code  contains  essential  information  about
the document  and  its  owner,  which  simplifies  machine  reading  of data.
Obtaining  the passport  number,  the birth  date  and  the validity  period,
the reader  generates  an access  key.  The e-Passport  will  only  send  stored
data  to the reader  at radio  frequency  after  getting  this  access  key.
The physical  access  to the card  is  proven  this  way.  This  method  has
insufficient  security  features.  Breaking  the key  by using  the brute  force
method, because of the approximately 50-bit entropy, is theoretically more
than 35 years. However, some data analysis (choosing birth time intervals,
tracing passport numbering) reduces entropy to 35-bit so that the key can be
9 Council  Regulation  (EC)  No. 2252/2004  of 13  December  2004  on standards  for  security
features  and  biometrics  in passports  and  travel  documents  issued  by Member  States.
Official Journal  of the European  Union (L  385/1)  29  December.  Available  from:  http://data.
europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/2252/oj [Accessed 7 May 2018].
10 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection  of natural  persons  with  regard  to the processing  of personal  data  and
on the free  movement  of such  data,  and  repealing  Directive  95/46/EC  (General  Data
Protection Regulation).  Official Journal of the European Union (L 119/1) 4 May. Article 9 (1).
Available from: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj [Accessed 7 May 2018].
11 Council  Regulation  (EC)  No. 2252/2004  of 13  December  2004  on standards  for  security
features  and  biometrics  in passports  and  travel  documents  issued  by Member  States.
Official Journal  of the European  Union (L  385/1)  29  December.  Available  from:  http://data.
europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/2252/oj [Accessed 7 May 2018].
12 See Jóri, A.; Hegedűs, B.; Kerekes, Zs. (eds.) et al. (2010) Adatvédelem és információszabadság
a gyakorlatban. (Data protection and freedom of information in the practice). Complex, Budapest.
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broken within 3 hours.13 It has been proven, that the communication, having
Basic  Protection  (BAC),  has  been  cracked  in several  cases  and  the data
content  has  been  accessed.14 This  encryption  is  unsuitable  for  protecting
fingerprints,  so  a more  secure  procedure  has  been  developed,  which  is
called  the Extended Access  Control  (EAC).15 The EAC is  based  on ICAO
Doc  9303,  but  it  is  not  a uniform  standard.  Member  States  should  also
consider the change of numbering to a broader range, or random allocation
within the field.
4. EID PROTECTION OPTIONS
In eID  documents  like  in electronic  passports  a chip  is  embedded.
The stored data can be accessed through a contact or radio interface. As this
personal  data  can  be  potentially  abused,  countermeasures  should  be
implemented.  By radio  interface  cards  remote  reading  is  possible,
by a directional antenna from up to several meters. Thus it  is  not enough
to solve the security by physical protection alone. Under physical protection
in this  case  we  mean  that  we  take  care  of the card  and  only  give  it
to the one, with whom we want to share its full data content. The potential
attack  includes  eavesdropping  on the communication,  the acquisition
of saved data for example by skimming, as well as tracing. During tracing,
the attacker  prepares  a profile  of the target,  following  the geographic
movement of the card. Unfortunately, the latter is allowed by the ISO 14443
standard, which requires the unique identification of the chip card, before
communication.16
One  of the most  typical  ways  of protection  is  encryption,  where
the encryption algorithm is known by all compatible card readers, but with
the symmetric encryption key, only readers, with whom we want to share
the data,  have  the possibility  of decryption.  In this  case,  we  encounter
the key distribution problem, so if you have one hundred thousand readers,
you  either  use  the same  password  for  all,  and  you  cannot  change
13 Robroch, H. (2006)  ePassport Privacy Attack. Cards Asia Singapore.  [online]  Available from:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/828a/70de925744617be3d2886442cd0e88058c25.pdf
[Accessed 27 October 2017]. 
14 See Papp, Z. (2010) Az új technológiák veszélyei: RFID és az elektronikus útlevél (Hazards
of new technologies: RFID and e-Passport), Hadmérnök (Military Engineer), 5(4), pp. 248–254.
15 See Moses, T. (2010) Protecting Biometric Data with Extended Access Control. [online] Available
from:  https://www.entrust.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/01/WP_Entrust_ePassport-
Biometrics_Aug2014.pdf [Accessed 4 September 2017].
16 See Naumann, I.; Hogben, G. (2008)  Privacy features of European eID card specifications,
Network Security, August. 
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the compromised keys, or each reader uses a separate password, but then
passport management is challenging. The control of the readers' passwords
on the issued cards is impossible from an organizational point of view. This
method can  only  be  applied  in a closed  system,  for  example,  in the case
of a corporate solution.
With authentication controls, we want to limit access to data. In this case,
a short identification code should be provided from the reader's side, which
can be called a PIN (Personal Identification Number), CAN (Card Access
Number)  or code.  The reader  device  uses  this  piece  of information
to identify  itself  with  the card.  The card  gives  out  the stored  data  only
to the reader,  which  is  determined  in this  way.  The communication  can
optionally  be  encrypted,  which  can  happen  with  a session  key,  used
in the given connection, with a predetermined symmetric key, or the public
key-secret key pair, used for asymmetric encryption. The latter may be, for
example,  supplied  with  a service  provider  certification,  operated
by the issuing  authority.  The memory  of the card  can  be  divided  into
several  parts,  according  to the confidentiality  of the data.  The Spanish
electronic  identity  card's  memory  is  divided  into  three  sections,  for
example,  access  to the public  portion is  not  restricted,  access  to the secret
area  requires  the PIN  code  of the card,  while  only  public  administration
have access to the protected area.17
The plan  of the electronic  European  Health  Insurance  Cards  offers
an exciting  authentication  option,  which  defines  authentication  between
two smart  cards.  In doing so,  health data,  stored on the health insurance
card (HIC) of the patient, can be accessed only with the health professional
card (HPC) of the doctor, thus ensuring the protection of medical data.
Access to data may also be restricted by using an identifier. In this case,
eID shares only a user ID (UID) with the service provider, who logs into
a central  database,  to retrieve  the data  that  can  be  accessed  by him/her
by the UID.  However,  public  administration,  regardless  of all  these,  may
have direct access to the data, stored on the card. This solution can also raise
several  questions,  including  data  protection  issues,  affecting  the use
of a single  identifier,  a central  database,  accessible  by market  participants
and similar problems.
17 Sotirov, A. et al. (2009) Short Chosen-Prefix Collisions for MD5 and the Creation of a Rogue
CA Certificate. In: Halevi, S. (eds.) CRYPTO, LNCS 5677, pp. 55–69.
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The protection  of the privacy  is  more  efficiently  implemented
by modifying the previous ID configuration method, with the use of hashes.
A fingerprint  is  generated  from  an input  data  with  a so-called  hash
function,  which  is  a trapdoor  function,  which  means,  that  performing  it
in one  direction  is  simple,  but  in the other  direction,  it  is  a complicated
mathematical  task.  This  algorithm  generates  a constant  amount  of data
(128–512  byte)  from  any  amount  of data.  A change  of a single  bit
in the input data set will change at least 50 percent of the output bits (this is
the avalanche  effect).  The amount  of data,  applied  as  output,  is  called
a fingerprint since it characterizes the input data amount nearly in a unique
way.  The input  cannot  be  generated  from  the hash  code.  In practice,
typically the SHA-256, SHA-512, SHA-3 or the Whirlpool, or the algorithms
are  encountered.  The use  of obsolete  algorithms,  like  the MD5,  SHA-1
or RIPEMD-160  is  no longer  secure  for  electronic  signatures  or similar
purposes.18 If the hash value is formed from the UID by a usage-dependent
identifier,  we  make  it  harder  for  malicious  providers  to merge  personal
data,  which  are  stored  in various  databases.  Practically  the decryption
of the original (unified) UID from those is a mathematically impossible task.
An additional  way  of privacy  protection  is  that  the card  does  not
provide  personal  data,  stored  on it,  but  only  offers  the possibility
of comparison. In this case the reader optically reads the data and sends it
to the chip.  The chip  only  confirms  that  the sent  data  are  the same
as the data  stored  in the secure  container.  An example  of this  solution  is
the checking  of the fingerprint  pattern.  The reading  device  reads
the fingerprint of the person, who shows the identity document. The reader
generates a digital model from the optical picture, which can be interpreted
by the card.  The card compares  it  with  the fingerprint  data,  stored  in its
storage  and  provides  a percentage-probability  value  to the reader,
regarding the probability of the match. In this case, the reliability of the card
is  essential,  so  the card  must  provide  the answer  to the reader,  not
the attacker.
It is also possible to identify the user if the card is capable of electronic
signature.  One  option  is  when the card creates  a protected  channel  with
the system, which requires the identification, using a key-exchange protocol
(e.g. Diffie–Hellman  Key  Exchange).  The other  option  is  if the system
18  Ibid. 
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requesting the authentication sends a generated (pseudo)  random dataset
and it is electronically signed and returned by the person to be identified.
Although technically  both solutions are right,  misuse  of the data is  more
likely in the latter case, if the data package to be signed is not random, but
targeted generated data.
5. NEW IDENTITY CARD IN HUNGARY
Instead  of the former  paper-based  identity  card,  the Government  Decree
No. 168  of 1999  (XI. 24.)  issued  a plastic  card-based  identity  card  from
January  2000,  shown  in Figure  4.  This  step  aligns  with  the initiative
of the government  to increase  information  security  in e-governmental
relations.19 In addition, the ID1 (85.6 mm x 53.98 mm)20 standard card size
and water resistance are also favored by the cardholders. Its disadvantage
or just property was that it did not contain the address, which was issued
to the legitimate holder on a separate card (the same size) on the residence
permit certificate. This document has undergone several minor updates.
Figure 4: Hungarian Identity Card between 2000–201521
A significant  change  happened  by introducing  the electronic  Personal
Identification  Card  (eID  or “eSzemélyi”  in Hungarian),  from  1st January
2016,  shown  in Figure  5,  by the Government  Decree  No. 414  of 2015
(XII. 23.).  In addition  to the altered  design  and  the new  type  of security
features,  the eID  has  introduced  a contactless,  active  storage  device,
19 For detailed analysis of improving security legislation see Szádeczky, T. (2014): Information
Security – Strategy, Codification and awareness. In: Nemeslaki, A. (ed.): ICT Driven Public
Service Innovation. Comparative Approach Focusing on Hungary. Budapest, pp. 109–122.
20 Defined in the ISO/IEC 7810 standard.
21 European Council  and Council  of the European Union. (2017)  Public  Register  of Authentic
Travel  and  Identity  Documents  Online  (PRADO)  HUN-BO-03001.  [online] Available  from:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/prado/en/HUN-BO-03001/index.html 
[Accessed 20 September 2017].
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accessible  via a radio  interface,  that  is  similar  to the one that has already
been used for a decade for electronic passports.
Figure 5: Hungarian Identity Card from 201622
The visual  content  of the eID  is  practically  the same  as that  of the old
identity  card.  The optical  and  electronic  data  content  of the new  type
of identity card is included in the relevant Hungarian Act.23 These data have
been edited in Table 1.
Information Contained Visually24 In machine
(MRZ) code
In storage device25 
Name of the citizen Yes Yes Yes
Name of citizen,
in a minority language
At the request
of the citizen,
belonging
to the minority26
N/A N/A
Place of birth Yes N/A Yes
Date of birth Yes Yes Yes
Nationality Yes Yes Yes
Mother's name Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes
22 European Council  and Council  of the European Union.  (2017)  Public  Register  of Authentic
Travel  and  Identity  Documents  Online  (PRADO) HUN-BO-05001.  [online] Available  from:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/prado/en/HUN-BO-–05001/index.html 
[Accessed 20 September 2017].
23 Hungarian Act LXVI of 1992 on register of citizens’ personal data and address.  Hungary. Section
29.
24 Hungarian Act LXVI of 1992 on register of citizens’ personal data and address.  Hungary. Section
29. Paragraph 2. 
25 The document, “without deadlines”, which is available for those, over 65 years old, is in fact
a document, the validity of which is 60 years, and it does not contain any storage element,
see  Hungarian  Act  LXVI  of 1992  on register  of citizens’  personal  data  and  address.  Hungary.
Section 29/E. Paragraph 2. 
26 Hungarian Government  Decree  No. 414 of 2015 (XII.  23.)  on issuing  of ID cards and collection
of facial photo and signature. Hungary. Section 33. Paragraph 1.
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Facial Image Yes Yes Yes
Signature
In case of literate
person aged over
12 years
N/A
In case of literate
person aged over 12
years
Validity Yes Yes Yes
Document ID Yes Yes Yes
Issue Date Yes Yes Yes
Issuing Authority Yes Yes Yes
Travel restrictions on traveling abroad In specific cases
and ways
N/A In specific cases and
ways
Code number (CAN), needed
to start legitimate access to the data,
recorded in the storage element
If there is
a storage element N/A N/A
Fingerprint N/A N/A
In case of a person
aged over 12 years,
if he/she has not
refused it, and
if he/she is not
physically unable
to enroll
Data needed to create
the electronic signature
N/A N/A
At the request
of the citizen
Social security identification number N/A N/A Yes
Tax identification number N/A N/A Yes
The electronic,
unique identifier of the identity card
N/A N/A Yes
No more than two emergency
phone numbers to be notified
N/A N/A
At the request
of the citizen
Table 1: Data content of the Hungarian eID27
The validity of the permanent identity card is three years, under the age
of 18,  and  six  years  above  that.  Identity  cards  may  be  issued  “without
a deadline” for people aged above 65 years (the validity of which is in fact
60  years),  and  they  do  not  contain  any  electronic  storage  element.
The duration of the validity of the identification card, as a rule, fits the birth
date of the eligible person.28
27 Edited by the author, based on Hungarian Act LXVI of 1992 on register of citizens’ personal data
and address.
28 Hungarian Act LXVI of 1992 on register of citizens’ personal data and address.  Hungary. Section
29/E. 
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The identification  card  falls  within  the scope  of national  development
competence,  for  which  the European  Union  lays  down  security  and
functional  requirements.  As a document  that  can  be  used  for  proof
of identity,  the eID belongs to the highest  document protection category.29
According to the requirements, it  must be protected against full  or partial
forgery.  For  protection  methods,  the chemical,  physical,  technical,
technological and administrative procedures, and digital security methods
shall  be  used  together.30 Specific  protection  solutions  have been  defined
in the document  protection  plan,  and  they  are  not  publicly  available.
However, the picture of the document  and specific  security elements of it
are publicly available in the European Public Register of Authentic Travel
and Identity Documents Online (PRADO) system.
According  to the Regulation  on the Protection  of Security  Documents,
the electronic  security document  contains  a data storage device,  which  is
capable  of storing  the data.  It  is  integrated  into  the material.  In addition
to the document  protection  categories,  the law  also  names  the document
information security categories.31
In case of the eID, the following requirements apply:
• the stored data are encrypted, the encryption algorithm is at least
RSA 2048;
• limitation of recording, writing and overwriting of the data;
• application of extended access protocol;
• protected  communication  channel  between  the data  storage  and
the reader;
• manufacturer's certification of the data storage.
The storage  element  is  an electronic  data  carrier  unit,32 which  has
a certificate (CC EAL5+) according to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security  Evaluation,  and it  is  qualified  as  a secure  signature
creation device (SSCD).33
29 Hungarian Government Decree No. 86 of 1996. (VI. 14.) on the protection of security documents.
Hungary. Section 5/A (5)
30 Hungarian Government Decree No. 86 of 1996. (VI. 14.) on the protection of security documents.
Hungary.
31 Hungarian Government Decree No. 86 of 1996. (VI. 14.) on the protection of security documents.
Hungary. Appendix 2., II. 
32 Hungarian Act LXVI of 1992 on register of citizens’ personal data and address.  Hungary. Section
19. 
33 See Szádeczky, T. (2010) Pillars of IT Security,  Studia Iuridica Auctoritate Universitatis Pécs
Publicata, 2010(147), pp. 247–268.
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6. EID IN GERMANY AND IN EUROPE
A number of EU member states have already implemented an eID solution,
but  this  does  not  mean  that  all  are  implementing  eID  functions
to the National  ID  like  Germany  and  Hungary.  Here  eID  refers
to the Electronic Identification (eID) function for using public and private
services.  Table  2  shows  the form  of the eID  solution  per country.
As of today, 14 member states have implemented a national ID-based eID
solution.
Member State Form of the eID
Austria other forms
Belgium National ID
Bulgaria National ID
Croatia other forms
Cyprus online
Czech Republic National ID
Denmark online
Estonia National ID
Finland other forms
France online
Germany National ID
Greece online
Hungary National ID
Ireland online
Italy National ID
Latvia National ID
Lithuania National ID
Luxembourg National ID
Malta National ID
Netherlands National ID
Poland N/A
Portugal National ID
Romania N/A
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Slovakia National ID
Slovenia other forms
Spain National ID
Sweeden other forms
United Kingdom other forms
Table 2: eID solutions in the EU34
The Hungarian  eID  solution  is  apparently35 based  on the German
National  Identity  Card  (“neue  Personalauseis”  in German)  and
the Electronic Residence Permit, shown in Figures 6 and 7.36
Figure 6: German identity card from 201137
The German federal government introduced the new electronic identity
card  in 2011  to change  the old  paper-based  ones.38 The validity
of the permanent document over 24 years is ten years. In contrast to the free
Hungarian eID, the standard German eID (permanent, over 24 years) costs
28,80 Euro.39
34 Edited  by the author,  based  on PRADO  and  the data  collected  by the European
Commission.  Available  from:  https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/
Country+Overview+-+eID  [Accessed 6 February 2018].
35 No official communication was found about a German–Hungarian cooperation on this topic
but hardware, software and reader type shows that the German solution was the sample for
the Hungarian government.
36 Electronic  identification  schemes  notified  pursuant  to Article  9(1)  of Regulation  (EU)
No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and
trust  services  for  electronic  transactions  in the internal  market.  Official  Journal
of the European Union (2017/C 319/3) 26 September. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2017.319.01.0003.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2017:319:TOC
[Accessed 15 November 2017].
37 European Council  and Council  of the European Union.  (2017)  Public  Register  of Authentic
Travel  and  Identity  Documents  Online  (PRADO)  DEU-BO-02001.  [online]  Available  from:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/prado/en/DEU-BO-02001/image-166166.html   [Accessed
13 November 2017].
38 German Act on Identity Card 2009 (Personalausweisgesetz - PAuswG), BGBl. I S. 1346. Germany.
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7. FUNCTIONALITY AND SECURITY
Both the German and the Hungarian  electronic  identity  cards have three
main functions:
1. Electronic Travel Document (ePASS) function;
2. Electronic Identification (eID) function;
3. Electronic Signature (eSIGN) function.
The purpose  of the Electronic  Travel  Document  (ePASS)  is  to ensure
cross-border  access  as regulated  in the Schengen  Agreement.  Therefore,
in this aspect, it can only replace the passport just in specific cases.
The electronic  identification  function  makes  the usage
of the e-government functions more efficient. It is also planned that cross-
-border service will be available later, the area also appears as the European
Union Common List of Basic Public Services List  (EU CLBPS, a Common
List  of Basic Public Services)  or otherwise as a 12+8-list  element.40 The eID
functions  are  defined  in the electronic  IDentification,  Authentication  and
trust  Services  (eIDAS)41 and  in the Connecting  Europe  Facility  (CEF).42
Nonetheless,  implementation  in the Member  States  is  slow  and  far  from
what  is  expected  in both  the degree  of application  and  the content.43
The cooperation  between  the EU  member  states  is  at  a high  level44,  and
as of 29  September  2018,  the recognition  of notified  eID  solutions  will
39 German Decree on Identity Card Price (Personalausweisgebührenverordnung, PauswGebV)  2010,
BGBl. I S. 1477. Germany. § 1 (1) 2.
40 See Szabó, A. B. (2016) Okmányvédelem és az elektronikus személyazonosító igazolvány
(Document  security  and  the electronic  ID  card),  Hadmérnök  (Military  Engineer),  11(1),
pp. 13–17.
41 Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2015/296  of 24  February  2015  establishing
procedural  arrangements  for  cooperation  between  Member  States  on electronic
identification  pursuant  to Article  12(7)  of Regulation  (EU)  No  910/2014  of the European
Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic
transactions in the internal market.  Official Journal of the European Union (L 53/14) 25 Febr.
Available from: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2015/296/oj [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 
42 Regulation  (EU)  No. 1316/2013  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 11
December  2013  establishing  the Connecting  Europe  Facility,  amending  Regulation  (EU)
No. 913/2010 and repealing Regulations  (EC) No. 680/2007 and (EC) No. 67/2010.  Official
Journal of the European Union (L 348/129) 20 December. Available from: http://data.europa.eu
/eli/reg/2013/1316/oj [Accessed 7 May 2018].
43 See Siddhartha, A. (2008) National e-ID card schemes: A European overview,  Information
Security Technical Report, 2008(13), pp. 46–53.
44 Commission  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2015/296  of 24  February  2015  establishing
procedural  arrangements  for  cooperation  between  Member  States  on electronic
identification  pursuant  to Article  12(7)  of Regulation  (EU)  No. 910/2014  of the European
Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic
transactions in the internal market.  Official Journal of the European Union (L 53/14) 25 Febr.
Available from: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2015/296/oj [Accessed 7 May 2018].
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become  mandatory.  The Hungarian  eID  itself,  according  to the available
information, is ready to be notified. However, as of today, the only notified
solution is the German National Identity Card and the Electronic Residence
Permit.45 In fact, the problem lies not with the issuer, but at the acceptance,46
because member states are not yet ready to accept another member states’
eID  card.47 The reason  for  that  is  hardware,  firmware  and  software
incompatibilty.
The electronic signature (eSIGN) function is, in contrast to the previous
two  features,  entirely  in the interest  of the user.  It  is  possible  to create
an electronic signature on any document with the embedded PKI key pair
with S/MIME certificates. The process of creating an electronic signature is
as follows:  a specific  hash  function  (e.g. SHA-256)  generates  a hash  code
(fingerprint) from the data. A PKI cryptographic private key (of the signer)
encrypts this hash code, so we get the electronic signature, which will  be
a data packet,  independent of the input document (but might  be attached
to it).  The signed  document  and  the electronic  signature  can  be  sent
to a recipient  via a public  channel,  such  as an e-mail.  The recipient
deciphers  the electronic  signature  with  our  public  key,  so  he/she  gets
the hash  code  which  we  have  created.  In the meantime,  he/she  also
produces the fingerprint from the document sent and compares these two.
If they  are  the same,  it  shows  that  there  is  no  change  in the signed
document,  and,  that  the signature  of the document  was  carried  out
by a specific  key. However, this does not link the private key to a natural
person, it does not prove that it has not been revoked, and it is not possible
to determine the time of signature either.  To solve these issues,  additional
functions should be used.
There are two ways to solve the problem of connecting a key to a person,
i.e. to address the authenticity problem: on the one hand, by the web of trust
45 Electronic  identification  schemes  notified  pursuant  to Article  9(1)  of Regulation  (EU)
No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and
trust  services  for  electronic  transactions  in the internal  market.  Official  Journal
of the European Union (2017/C 319/3) 26 September. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2017.319.01.0003.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2017:319:TOC
[Accessed 15 November 2017].
46 Hornung,  G.  (2005)  Die  digitale  Identität.  Rechtsprobleme von Chipkartenausweisen:  Digitaler
Personalausweis,  elektronische  Gesundheitskarte,  JobCard-Verfahren  (The digital  identity.  Legal
problems  of chipcard-IDs:  digital  national  ID,  electronic  social  security  card,  JobCard-process).
Nomos, Baden Baden, p. 379.
47 See  the current  implementation  report  at CEF  Digital.  Country  overview:  eIDAS-Node
Implementation. [online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDI
GITAL/Country+Overview+-+eID [Accessed 15 November 2017]. 
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method,  used  by PGP.48 This  way,  each  person's  keys  are  signed
by the persons,  trusting  each  other.  So if the recipient  knows  any  person
signing the sender's key or he/she can trace back the signatures to a trusted
person,  then  this  will  also  guarantee  the reliability  of the person.
The disadvantage of this method is that it requires extensive trust networks,
i.e. that  two  people  who  do  not  know  each  other  have  a common
acquaintance.  The other  way  is  to use  the S/MIME  system.  Here
the reliability of the parties is certified by a third party, trusted by each side,
through a certificate, which is an electronic data set including the public key
as well.  The third party is  a Certificate  Service  Provider,  CSP,  considered
as a trustworthy  person  by the government,  who  checks  the association
of the key  and  the key  holder  before  issuing  the certificate,  for  example
by requiring to provide an identity card. These certification providers form
a certification chain, with the highest certification authority (CA) at the top.
These  CAs  are  accepted  by the public  at large,  and  hence,  the rest
of the certification chain also becomes reliable.
Authentication  of the signing  time  is  done  by the Time  Stamping
Authority  (TSA),  who  provides  the exact  time  with  their  electronic
signature,  which  the sender  will  incorporate  into  the electronic  signature
of the document.  The application for  the time stamp is  carried out  online
via the Internet. The reliability of the TSA is ensured by its certificate, which
can  be  traced  back  to a CA  along  the certification  chain.  The use
of electronic  signatures  or certificates  is  usually  limited.  Typically,  a key
pair can only be used for electronic signature or encryption or setting up
a secure link (SSL). If one wants to use several functions from these, more
key pairs or certificates may be needed.
The e-signature and time stamping service,  related to the new identity
card,  is  provided  by the NISZ  National  Infocommunications  Service
Company  Ltd.,  as a government  authentication  service  provider.
The certification  applied  in the Hungarian  eID  corresponds
to the requirements of the eIDAS Regulation49, just like the German eID.50
48 See Alfarez, A.-R. (1997) The PGP Trust Model. EDI-Forum, April.
49 Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014
on electronic  identification  and  trust  services  for  electronic  transactions  in the internal
market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. Official Journal of the European Union (L 257/73)
28 August. Available from: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj [Accessed 7 May 2018].
50 Hornung, G.; Engemann, C. (2016)  Der digitale Bürger und seine Identität (The digital citizen
and his identity). Nomos, Baden Baden, p. 207.
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The Hungarian eSzig Card Management Utility51 can be used to activate
and  change  the electronic  PIN  codes  and  to see  e-signature  certificates.
It runs on the 7, 8, 8.1, 10 32 and 64-bit versions of the Microsoft Windows.
It also supports the versions of the Apple Mac OS X Yosemite, El Capitan,
Sierra,  and some Linux  distributions  and versions  (CentOS  7,  Debian  8,
SuSe 13.2,  Ubuntu 14.04.5 LTS).52 Its  developer is  ID&Trust  Ltd.,  a small
Hungarian business operating on the international chip card market.
The German desktop-based application is called “AusweisApp2”. It has
a different design, but similar functionality: the user may see the data stored
on the card and may change the PIN code. There is also a function where
the links to the available services are collected. The developer is Governikus
GmbH & Co. KG. In both cases, the Ministry of Interior is  responsible for
the development and the operation. Both applications are lack of integrated
functions. Thus the citizen does not need to use them regularly. But active
usage is required for the acceptance of e-government services.53
8. CONCLUSION
With  the development  of card-based  data  storage  technology  and
the increasing data storage and processing capacity of the cards, they can be
used more and more efficiently for access and personal identification. With
increasing complexity, the volume and quality of the stored data are also
growing.  Earlier,  there  was  far  less  personal  data  printed  on the card.
The development in functionality, in addition, poses a new data protection
risk.
From  the functional  side  by the introduction  of the electronic  identity
card  (eID),  the Hungarian  government,  similarly  to some  other  EU
governments, like Belgium, Estonia, and Germany, has made a considerable
leap in e-government and it  has opened up a number of widely available
functions.
The electronic  identification  and  electronic  signature  functions  may
revolutionize  the e-government  and  electronic  literacy,  since
the governments provide all the required elements. In Hungary, this means
51 Hungarian  Ministry  of Interior.  (2017)  eID  thematic  website. [online] Available  from:
http://www.kekkh.gov.hu/Eszemelyi/  [Accessed 24 September 2017].
52 Hungarian  Ministry  of Interior.  (2017)  eID  thematic  website. [online] Available  from:
http://www.kekkh.gov.hu/Eszemelyi/kartya_funkcioi/kartyaolvaso_alkalmazas [Accesed 24
September 2017].
53 Bieler,  F.  Schwarting,  G.  (2007)  e-Government.  Perspektive –  Probleme –  Lösungsansätze
(Perspective, Problems, Solutions).  Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, p. 271.
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free  access  to both  of above  functions,  which  makes  the critical  element
of the electronic  literacy  widely  accessible.  Using  of “may”  is  due
to the skepticism  of the author:  by the appearance  of electronic  signature
in the 2000s and then the rapid legislation, made the professionals hope for
a wide range of application, which eventually did not happen. In any case,
the governments  do  indeed  create  at least  the possibility  of development
by providing the new type of identity cards.
All new technologies and increasing complexity also generate new types
of risks, which the governments and citizens must take into consideration.
Cryptographic  measures  are  effective  against  a lot  of attacks,  e.g. using
well-known  algorithms  with  large  keys  protects  us  from eavesdroppers.
However, cryptography does not defend us in every case. The Estonian eID
was  using  a well-known,  certified  chip,  but  the implementation  was
vulnerable  to the Coppersmith  attack  for  some  years.  Because  of this,
750,000  valid  Estonian  eIDs  became  compromised,  which  is  the worst
nightmare  of any  issuers.54 Nevertheless,  in some  cases,  tracking  is
by design possible.  In such cases, the citizen will  need to apply additional
technical and organizational measures.
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